




BETWEEN AFFECT AND SIGNIFIER: A COMPARISON OF 







In an argument whose insistence should not conceal its undertone of clinical failure, Freud 
famously asserted that psychotic patients do not qualify for psychoanalytic treatment, owing 
to their incapacity for mild positive transference (Freud 1905: 264; 1916-17: 447; and 1940: 
173). Despite the forcefulness of Freud’s claim, psychoanalysts have challenged its accuracy 
and endeavoured to demonstrate that the remit of psychoanalysis can be extended profitably 
beyond the realm of neurotic disorders. Through conceptual elaboration and clinical 
experiment, innovators such as Melanie Klein (1946), Frieda Fromm-Reichmann (1950), 
Paul Federn (1952), Herbert Rosenfeld (1965), John Rosen (1953; 1962), Gisela Pankow 
(1969; 1977), Marguerite Sechehaye (1956) and Marion Milner (1969) have tried to prove 
that psychotic conditions are not just of theoretical interest to the psychoanalyst but offer 
valuable indications for psychoanalytic intervention. 
 
Theoretically, these authors have criticised Freud’s exceedingly narrow conception of 
transference and have facilitated a deeper understanding of narcissism, aggression and ego-
deficiency, as the quintessentially psychotic features. Clinically, they have modified some of 
the central tenets of classic psychoanalytic technique (free association, evenly suspended 
attention, interpretation) to accommodate the mental processes of the psychotic patient, and 
they have transmuted the role of the analyst from a neutral facilitator of psychic productions 
to a more active, directive guide who oscillates between a supportive mother-figure and a 
prohibiting paternal agency. In some cases, the therapeutic successes obtained by means of 
these new psychoanalytic approaches in allegedly severe cases of schizophrenia have been 





initial diagnosis and to suggest the possibility of a hysterical structure hiding underneath the 
overt psychotic picture. For example, in a meticulous historical study of the ostensibly 
paradoxical label of ‘hysterical psychosis’ in the psychiatric and psychoanalytic literature, 
Katrien Libbrecht (1995) has claimed that many of the patients diagnosed as schizophrenic 
by the new psychoanalysts of psychosis are in fact hysterics manifesting psychotic 
phenomena. This contentious account has recently been supported by Juliet Mitchell, who 
has offered the clinical rationale behind Libbrecht’s historical research, concluding that ‘a 
number of today’s “psychotics” are in fact yesterday’s “hysterics” and were correctly 
designated as such before’ (Mitchell 2000: 176). 
 
One of the most far-reaching and influential contributions to a new psychoanalytic treatment 
model for psychosis is Hyman Spotnitz’s clinical paradigm of ‘modern psychoanalysis’. 
Drawing on his yearlong experience with treating psychotic patients and his vast knowledge 
of the professional literature, Spotnitz argued in his seminal Modern Psychoanalysis of the 
Schizophrenic Patient that Freud had failed to appreciate the specific quality of the psychotic 
transference, probably as a result of his own countertransference resistance, which may have 
conditioned his focus on the object-value of the transference and induced the scotomisation 
of other, narcissistic transference manifestations (Spotnitz 1985: 21-23). Yet apart from re-
situating psychosis within an operative framework of narcissistic transference (Spotnitz and 
Meadow 1995: 55-67), Spotnitz also re-conceptualized psychotic disorders as such. In his 
view, psychosis constitutes the pathological outcome of a traumatic frustration of the child’s 
maturational needs during the pre-verbal, pre-oedipal stage of psychological development. 
Rather than attributing this condition to purely environmental factors, and thus eschewing 
notions such as the schizophrenogenic parent (Jackson, Block and Patterson 1958; Mac 
Andrew and Geertsma 1961), Spotnitz embraced an interactionist perspective, 
acknowledging the significance of hereditary, constitutional as well as psychological and 
social influences (Spotnitz 1987a: 101, Spotnitz and Meadow 1995: 45), without 
compromising the therapeutic reversibility of the disorder (Spotnitz 1985: 34). Whilst 
adopting Freud’s designation of psychosis as a narcissistic neurosis (Freud 1916-17: 447), 





emanates. In his view, psychosis is therefore not only a pre-oedipal, pre-verbal disorder, but 
also an emotional illness which manifests itself through a debilitating mixture of narcissism, 
withdrawal, aggression and destructive impulsivity. 
 
Since the early 1970s, Spotnitz’s ideas have given rise to a new operational theory for the 
psychoanalytic treatment of psychotic patients, a clinical modus operandi with a solid 
theoretical basis known as ‘modern psychoanalysis’ (Meadow 1996b: 137-39). When 
working with psychotics, the modern analyst generally stimulates the transformation of the 
patient’s narcissistic (pre-oedipal) transference into a more manageable object (oedipal) 
transference (Spotnitz 1987c: 144), via a continuous reflection upon his or her own 
narcissistic countertransference resistance (the therapists’ unwillingness to ascertain the 
emotions elicited in themselves by their patients’ narcissistic transference) and specific 
techniques such as maturational interpretation (Spotnitz 1987b: 43-6), ego-dystonic and -
syntonic joining, and psychological reflecting and mirroring (Spotnitz 1985: 249-89). As far 
as treatment goals are concerned, Spotnitz does not consider the patient’s return to the pre-
morbid, pre-psychotic state of functioning to be sufficiently advanced, for the simple reason 
that this state is always already pathological (ibid. 34). Instead, he believes that the treatment 
is only terminated when the patient has re-established a sense of psychic equilibrium and a 
stable mental foundation for personal growth. As Spotnitz put it at the very end of Modern 
Psychoanalysis of the Schizophrenic Patient: ‘The patient who has successfully undergone 
modern psychoanalysis emerges in a state of emotional maturity. With the full symphony of 
human emotions at his disposal, and abundantly equipped with psychic energy, he 
experiences the pleasure of performing at his full potential. When this state has been 
stabilised, modern psychoanalysis has achieved its ultimate goal’ (Spotnitz 1985: 288-9). 
 
In recent years, under the influence of research-active clinicians working at Modern 
Psychoanalytic Institutes in various parts of North America, yet mainly by virtue of the 
inspiring and programmatic work of Phyllis W. Meadow, Spotnitz's theoretical vision has 
been expanded to encompass a broader spectrum of narcissistic neuroses (schizophrenia, 





produce more pervasive and lasting results, and his outlook on psychoanalytic training has 
been developed institutionally and qualitatively to meet the highest standards of professional 
practice. The most interesting contemporary developments include extending the application 
of modern psychoanalytic principles to group analysis (Spotnitz and Meadow 1995: 245-62; 
Meadow 1996a), fostering the recognition of the so-called ‘negative union’ (a sensory state 
of primitive bodily experience occurring during the first months of life) in view of the 
completion of the treatment (Meadow 1996c), and encouraging a more detailed investigation 
of the part played by the anaclitic countertransference resistance (the analysts’ failure to 
acknowledge the emotions induced in themselves by the patient’s craving for dependency) in 
the resolution of the patient’s maturational needs (Spotnitz 1985: 236; Spotnitz and Meadow 
1995: 263). 
 
When studying the modern psychoanalytic theory of psychosis and its clinical implications in 
light of my own training within the Lacanian tradition, I was first of all struck by some 
remarkable similarities between the two paradigms, especially pertaining to the techniques 
used with psychotic patients. In Modern Psychoanalysis of the Schizophrenic Patient, 
Spotnitz stresses on numerous occasions how the psychoanalyst should encourage patients to 
verbalise their narcissism and aggression, without using these utterances as material for 
interpretation or fostering understanding. The following passage is particularly revealing in 
this respect: ‘No attempt is made to influence the production of psychotic material. The 
patient is not discouraged in any way from revealing it but its significance is not called to his 
attention or explained to him. No effort is made to help him understand it.’ (Spotnitz 1985: 
166). And even more forcefully: ‘The more the patient strives to understand, on the other 
hand, the more confused and emotionally withdrawn he becomes. Absorption in the quest for 
understanding creates a barrier to communication, inhibiting progressive verbalisation and 
facilitating repetition. The striving to understanding thus becomes, in a sense, a form of 
resistance to verbal communication.’ (ibid. 169). When Lacan conducted his seminar of 
1955-56 on the issue of psychosis, he devoted the first two lessons to an elaborate critique of 
Karl Jaspers’ notion of the ‘relation of understanding’ and its impact on contemporary 





psychotic patient, or at encouraging the patient’s self-understanding, Lacan argued that if 
there is an ‘understandable kernel’ in the psychotic's condition, it will always be 
‘inaccessible, inert, and stagnant with respect to any dialectic’ (ibid. 22). If the patient 
elaborates on an ostensibly meaningful aspect, it will be ‘constantly repeated,’ ‘without any 
answer, any attempt to integrate it into a dialogue, ever being made’ (ibid. 22). 
 
Much more than any other psychoanalytic treatment paradigm for psychotic patients, modern 
psychoanalysis operates with and on the transference, that is to say it proceeds from the basic 
principle that psychic conflicts can only be dealt with once they have acquired a transference-
value. Modern analysts are therefore particularly attuned to recognising and reflecting the 
patient’s transference-resistance, a procedure which can only be implemented beneficially if 
they themselves remain in touch with their countertransference. In a similar vein, Lacanian 
psychoanalysts emphasise the transference both as a conditio sine qua non for the start of the 
psychoanalytic process, an exceedingly important yet potentially explosive factor for its 
continuation, and a component which needs to be analysed in view of the end of the 
treatment. Lacan did not accept the possibility — professed by many psychoanalysts in the 
wake of Freud’s intermittent suggestion of a removal, resolution or dissolution of the patient-
analyst relationship (Freud 1912a: 105; Freud 1912e: 118; Freud 1916-17: 455) — of the 
transference being ‘liquidated’ (Lagache 1952: 112-3), yet he firmly believed in the necessity 
of a fall (chute), or a reduction (réduction) of the transference at the end of analysis (Lacan 
1967-68: session of 10 January 1968). 
 
Beyond these and other technical similarities, some crucial differences separate the modern 
psychoanalytic from the Lacanian approach. I shall briefly address what I consider to be the 
most significant of these discrepancies: 1. The definition of psychosis; 2. The definition of 
transference; 3. The conceptualisation of psychotic transference; 4. The analyst’s position in 
the treatment; 5. Psychoanalytic treatment goals for psychotic patients. In contrasting the 
modern psychoanalytic and the Lacanian perspective, I have no intention of demonstrating 
that Lacanian theory is theoretically and clinically superior to modern psychoanalysis, nor do 





paradigm of ‘modern Lacanian psychoanalysis’ or ‘post-modern psychoanalysis.’ For the 
purposes of this paper, it seems more interesting to me to highlight the divergence and to 
stimulate debate, than to arrive at a new synthesis. Also, as I pointed above, Lacanian and 
modern psychoanalysts agree on a number of technical points, which indicates that the 
theoretical differences need to be judged separately from their clinical application, although it 
would evidently be a worthwhile venture to examine how theoretically different conceptions 
of mental dysfunctioning and the psychoanalytic strategies for dealing with it can still 
converge into similar clinical procedures. 
 
In modern psychoanalysis, psychosis is defined as a pre-verbal, emotional illness which is ‘in 
large measure the product of unfavourable maturational factors connected with preoedipal 
development’ (Spotnitz 1985: 70). As a result of these maturational difficulties, the psychotic 
patient is emotionally deprived and retreats into ‘a psychological straightjacket to prevent 
himself from acting as his aggressive impulses tell him to act’ (Spotnitz and Meadow 1995: 
44). In Lacanian psychoanalysis, psychosis, like neurosis and perversion, is by definition an 
Oedipal problem. It is a mental structure originating in a set of conflictual relationships 
during which a subject’s access to the symbolic order of language, with all its prohibitions 
and injunctions, is at stake. Unlike the neurotic, who manages, more or less successfully, to 
substitute the symbolic law, as represented by what Lacan called the ‘Name-of-the-Father’ 
(Lacan 1977a: 67), for a continuous exposure to the whimsical demands of the Other, the 
psychotic, owing to an ‘unsoundable decision of being’ (Lacan 2006[1946]: 145), does not 
become a symbolically alienated, desiring subject, but remains an object of enjoyment for the 
desire of the Other. Lacan designated the causal mechanism of psychosis as the foreclosure of 
the Name-of-the-Father (Lacan 2006[1959]: 465 Aparicio 1984; Grigg 1998; Rabinovitch 
1998; Maleval 2000), taking his lead from Freud’s notion of Verwerfung as it appeared in his 
case-study of the Wolf Man (Freud 1918: 79-80), yet extending it to cover the mechanism of 
projection as explained in the Schreber study (Freud 1911: 66). The psychotic then re-
organises the so-called preoedipal relations retroactively through the lens of the Oedipal 
failure, and via the work of the delusion he or she will try to re-establish a relatively stable 





his 1956-57 seminar on object-relations, Lacan explicitly rejected preoedipality as a separate 
stage of psychosexual development, arguing that even the earliest mother-child relationship is 
always already infected by symbolically induced conflicts of interest (Lacan 1994). The 
corollary of this outlook is that psychosis is not an emotional disorder but first and foremost a 
disorder of speech and language (Lacan 2006[1959]: 447-53; 1977a[1964]: 238). Whatever 
emotions the psychotic patient experiences — anger, anxiety, sadness, etc. — the shape in 
which they manifest themselves is always conditioned by the symbolic, representational 
structure in which they are embedded. 
 
Whereas modern psychoanalysts essentially distinguish between object-transference and 
narcissistic transference, each of these versions acquiring positive or negative qualities 
depending on the nature of the patient-analyst relationship, Lacan initially entertained a 
distinction between imaginary and symbolic transference (Lacan 1988[1953-54]). Symbolic 
transference is synonymous with the patient’s productive engagement in what Lacan dubbed 
‘full speech’: a type of speech which does not cover up the unconscious and which signals a 
genuine subjective commitment to the verbalisation of what cannot be talked about. 
Imaginary transference is exactly the opposite. Here, the patient resists the unconscious, 
spends her analytic sessions giving the analyst a rundown of what she has done since her last 
appointment, starts every sentence with ‘I think I am...’, gossips at length about people she 
thinks the analyst is also interested in, tries to maintain a certain image of herself to please 
the analyst, etc. Hence the difference between imaginary and symbolic transference is not 
that the former is characterised by hatred, aggression and violence, and the latter by love, 
willingness and cooperation. Loving compliance may as easily be a function of the 
unproductive imaginary transference as hateful expressiveness may be an ingredient of the 
productive symbolic transference. 
 
During the 1950s and early 1960s Lacan gradually exchanged his dual conception of 
transference for a more unitary notion with two distinct aspects. At the end of his Seminar XI, 
for example, he suggested that a given mental structure only shows one kind of transference 





importantly, however, is Lacan’s critique of the Freudian view of transference as an 
‘emotional tie’ (Freud 1916-17: 431-47) and his reformulation of the bond between patient 
and analyst as an attribution of knowledge. Indeed, from his Seminar VIII, On Transference 
(Lacan 2015[1960-61]), Lacan envisaged transference as a function of the ‘supposed-subject-
of-knowing’ (sujet-supposé-savoir), thus reducing the dynamic impact of its affective 
qualities and concentrating on its epistemological value (Miller 1984: 35). This does not 
imply that Lacan suddenly identified transference as an affectless bond — until the end of his 
career he also glossed transference as a state of love — but quite simply that he subsumed 
transferential affect under the more-encompassing category of an (erotic and eroticising) 
attribution of knowledge. 
 
Compared to Lacan’s minimal and tentative assertions in his two main texts on psychosis, the 
transcript of Seminar III (Lacan 1993[1955-56]) and the 1957-58 paper ‘On a Question Prior 
to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis’ (Lacan 2006[1959]), modern psychoanalysis 
contains a much more advanced and sophisticated theory of psychotic transference. For the 
modern psychoanalyst, the psychotic patient is confined to a narcissistic, preoedipal and 
preverbal type of transference, a not necessarily fully-developed, yet regressive emotional 
bond characterised by bottled up hostility turned inwards (narcissistic defense), a strong 
denial of feelings and a tight control of destructive impulsivity (Spotnitz and Meadow 1995: 
55-67). Yet the psychotic patient is also considered capable of mature object-transference, 
and precisely herein lies a central strategy of the modern psychoanalytic treatment of 
psychotics (Spotnitz 1985: 76-7). Helping the patient to develop the narcissistic transference 
(Meadow 1996d: 194), analysing the narcissistic transference resistance, facilitating the 
transition to object-transference and analysing its own resistances, whilst all the time staying 
in tune with their own countertransference, modern analysts do not only diagnose psychosis 
through transference, but effectuate a cure by virtue of a fundamental transferential transition 
in the psychotic condition. 
 
Despite being trained as a psychiatrist, registering his first clinical experiences with 





seemed very reluctant to broach the issue of psychotic transference. Unlike Freud, he was 
convinced that the psychoanalyst should not back away from psychosis (Lacan 1977b: 12), 
yet at the same time he was not particularly forthcoming with concrete indications as to how 
exactly he expected the psychoanalyst to face psychosis. Lacan’s reluctance to formulate 
clinically applicable principles, here, is particularly conspicuous with regard to the existence 
and precise nature of psychotic transference. In his Seminar III, Lacan at one point filed 
Schreber’s relationships with the various masculine figures in his delusional system under the 
heading of transference, yet immediately qualifying his choice of words with the statement 
that the concept ‘is undoubtedly not to be taken in quite the sense that we usually mean’ 
(Lacan 1993: 31). Shortly afterwards, in his 1957-58 paper, Lacan produced a more 
inflammatory argument, insisting that much of the literature on psychosis and transference 
merely fuels many a psychoanalyst’s belief that psychosis can be cured in all those instances 
when a psychosis is not present (Lacan 2006[1959]). Yet instead of entering the debate on 
psychotic transference himself, and producing a valuable alternative, Lacan postponed 
discussion of the issue, retreating behind the excuse that his purpose consisted in returning to 
Freud and not going beyond him. Hence, in Lacanian theory, the question is left open as to 
whether psychotics manifest transference at all and if so, what type of transference it is. 
Combining Lacan’s reformulation of the transference as a function of the ‘supposed-subject-
of-knowing’ with some of his ideas on the status of psychotic knowledge, it would make 
sense to argue that psychotic patients, owing to their solidified knowledge and their radical 
absence of doubt about the truth of their experiences, are unlikely to attribute knowledge to 
the psychoanalyst, which would exclude them from the possibility of transference. Yet does 
this absence of the ‘supposed-subject-of-knowing’ imply that transference is rendered 
impossible altogether? Don’t we run the risk here of falling into the same trap as Freud who, 
as Spotnitz has perceptively demonstrated (Spotnitz 1985: 21-4), only regarded the mild 
positive transference as conceptually viable and therapeutically useful, implicitly discarding 
narcissistic transference as a contradiction in terms? 
 
Prompted by many a clinician’s bemused confrontation with the peculiarities of psychotic 





of psychotic transference with the organisation of international conferences (Fondation du 
Champ freudien 1988), the installation of specific work-parties (GRAPP 1988, 1990), and the 
publication of numerous themed journal issues. Given the volume of existing materials and 
the often conflicting positions expressed therein, I cannot possibly offer a detailed survey of 
this body of research within the space of this paper. Therefore I will restrict myself to a 
presentation of some of the most interesting developments in this area. Addressing the vexed 
issue as to which position a psychotic patient attributes to the psychoanalyst, Calligaris has 
distinguished between two conditions, depending on the patient’s clinical state. When the 
patient is not suffering from a psychotic crisis (psychose hors-crise), the psychoanalyst is 
questioned as a knowledge, without a supposed subject; instead of consulting a 
psychoanalyst, the psychotic in fact consults psychoanalysis as such. When the patient is in 
crisis, however, the only transference he or she is able to manifest is an unmediated, direct 
relationship with an imaginary devouring Other, which excludes any possibility for adopting 
a subjective position (Calligaris 1991). Relying on a minuscule suggestion by Lacan in his 
1966 introduction to the French translation of Schreber’s memoirs, more orthodox Lacanians 
have elaborated the psychotic transference as a ‘mortifying erotomania’ (Lacan 1996: 4). 
Silvestre, for instance, has argued that whereas the psychotic’s initial demand may very well 
be a demand for signification, the transference will rapidly expose the patient as somebody 
who proposes his enjoyment to the analyst, as someone who presents himself as an object of 
enjoyment for the Other. In the best of cases, this position is mediated by the demand for 
love, yet it may also deteriorate into a position of pure waste. In the latter case, the analyst 
may feel very tempted to react with a supportive, comforting and nourishing attitude, yet 
according to Silvestre this reaction needs to be avoided at all costs, since it can easily induce 
more profound withdrawal, despondency and procrastination, and even suicide (Silvestre 
1993: 206-8). 
 
In an extensive monograph devoted entirely to Lacan’s theory of psychosis, Maleval has 
highlighted the notion of ‘mortifying erotomania’ again, crediting Silvestre for exploring its 
clinical consequences and adding his own ideas to the deployment of a Lacanian theory of 






When he addresses himself to an analyst, the psychotic subject first of all demands help 
with the organisation of his world, and he is quite keen to suppose that the analyst has 
knowledge on this point, yet he confirms that he himself has knowledge too, which the 
elementary phenomena [the hallucinations] have transmitted to him. Accepting that the 
patient testifies to these phenomena without contesting them in frontal fashion is an 
indispensable condition for the treatment. Being responsive to the demand for 
supplanting [suppléer] the disorder with a necessarily prefabricated knowledge tends to 
mobilize the mortifying erotomania rather than opposing it. Only in countering the 
delocalized enjoyment [jouissance] can the psychotic transference be relieved. 
Maleval 2000: 373  
 
Apart from making clear, once again, that Lacanians acknowledge the existence of a singular 
psychotic transference, this passage also shows that they consider the transference to be an 
essential factor for inducing change and a crucial element for evaluating the effectiveness of 
the treatment. 
 
The aforementioned developments within contemporary Lacanian theory also demonstrate 
that it is impossible to dissociate considerations of the psychotic transference from ongoing 
reflections upon the position of the analyst. Silvestre is adamant that all attempts at feeding 
the patient’s need for gratification are counter-productive and may even elicit the further 
deterioration of his or her mental condition. This idea chimes with the modern psychoanalytic 
view, as expressed by Spotnitz and Meadow, that the analyst who tries to soothe the 
psychotic patient is barking up the wrong tree and may inadvertently invigorate the psychotic 
mechanism: ‘The schizophrenic patient responds to a sympathetic approach by developing a 
warmly positive attachment, and the more attached he becomes the more schizophrenic he 
becomes’ (Spotnitz and Meadow 1995: 41). Yet, whereas the modern psychoanalyst seems to 
fluctuate between being responsive and being aggressive, the Lacanian analyst is generally 
detached to the point of being no more than a secretary for the patient’s delusional 





the patient to construct the delusion as a relatively stable solution to the traumatic intrusion of 
hallucinatory voices and petrifying bodily experiences (Soler 1987). Additionally, however, 
Lacanian analysts try to tackle the psychotic’s submersion in the chaotic maelstrom of 
uncontrollable enjoyment, fostering the creation of a liveable mental space and an acceptable 
level of social competence (Broca 1985, 1988). To realise this, a set of symbolic rules is 
imposed which blocks the destructive channels of the psychotic’s enjoyment, such as self-
mutilation, suicidal attempts and interpersonal violence, and enforces alternative outlets such 
as writing, painting or making music (Soler 1987: 31). 
 
This brings me to the last aspect of my brief comparative study of modern and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis: the treatment goals for psychotic patients. Here, it strikes me that modern 
psychoanalysts are much more optimistic than their Lacanian counterparts. Whereas modern 
psychoanalysts believe in the reversibility of the psychotic condition, and advocate a view 
which stresses the replacement of the preoedipal, narcissistic transference with oedipal, 
object-transference, Lacanian psychoanalysts generally restrict themselves to the installation 
of a less debilitating, more manageable structure, which does not mean that the question of a 
normalisation of the psychotic structure has not been raised (Lazarus-Matet 1988). Lacanians 
consider neurosis, psychosis and perversion — the three constitutive structures of mental 
functioning in Lacanian theory — to be mutually exclusive and do not believe in the 
possibility of transforming the psychic determinants of one structure into those of another 
structure. At best, a semblance of neurotic functioning can be achieved through the 
installation of a so-called ‘suppletion’ (suppléance). This term, which Lacan advanced in his 
seminar on Joyce (Lacan 2016[1975-76]) covers a welter of psychic realisations, ranging 
from imaginary identifications to symbolic creative productions and real somatic phenomena, 
which may prevent the outbreak of a flourishing psychotic picture (when the patient is pre- or 
post-psychotic), or stabilise the psychotic condition when the patient is effectively in crisis. 
Instead of a full recovery and the installation of a neurotic structure, Lacanians have often 
promoted the installation of a suppletion as one of the most advanced goals of the 







As I pointed out earlier, it has not been my intention in this paper to champion Lacanian 
psychoanalysis as a more conceptually sophisticated, theoretically correct and clinically 
valuable approach to psychosis than modern psychoanalysis, even less to stimulate the 
integration of both frameworks into a new paradigm. Modern psychoanalysts have definitely 
done more work over the past forty years to rescue the psychotic transference from the 
archives of oblivion than Lacanians, and also seem to have a more substantial notion of how 
the psychoanalyst can use the psychotic transference to the benefit of the patient. 
 
Whereas modern psychoanalysts emphasise the preoedipal affective determinants of the 
psychotic disorder, Lacanians focus more exclusively on the Oedipal impact of the symbolic 
order and the psychic functioning of speech and language. For André Green, Lacan’s 
emphasis on the material cause of the signifier (Lacan 2006[1965]: 743) was sufficient to 
argue that Lacan had failed to acknowledge the significance of the affect in psychoanalysis 
(Green 2001), to which Lacan replied by saying that ‘a body . . .  is  . . . affected only by the 
structure’ (Lacan 1987: 22). Similarly, a Lacanian analyst could easily criticise modern 
psychoanalysis for failing to incorporate a (post-)structuralist theory of language, a neglect 
made worse by the strong emphasis on verbalisation in modern psychoanalytic practice, to 
which the modern analyst would presumably reply with the statement that a word only 
matters in terms of its affective value. The challenge is not to evaluate one paradigm in terms 
of the other, to criticise modern psychoanalysis for not being sufficiently Lacanian or to take 
issue with Lacanian psychoanalysis for not being sufficiently ‘modern’, but to investigate 
how each approach can benefit from the confrontation, not with a prospect of obtaining 
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